


16.422 Information & Signal Detection Theory


Prof. R. John Hansman

*Acknowledgements to Profs Tom Sheridan and Jim Kuchar
whose notes are the core of this lecture*




Outline

- **Information Theory**
 - **Signal Detection Theory**
 - **Alerting Introduction**
-




Information Theory

- **What is information?**
- **Control Theoretic View**
 - Lines in Control Block Diagram




- **Bayesian View**
 - Information is something which reduces uncertainty in a world model
-



• Shannon Information Theory


- Bell Labs
- Telephony



SENDER → ENCODER → CHANNEL → DECODER → RECEIVER



STIMULUS → SENSOR → BRAIN → EFFECTOR → ENVIRONMENT



MESSAGE SET

x_1
 x_2
 x_3
 x_4
 \vdots

RESPONSE SET

y_1
 y_2
 y_3
 y_4
 \vdots


GIVEN T
 WHAT IS X ?

GROUND RULES: $p(x_i)$ KNOWN A PRIORI

STIMULUS (MESSAGE) CHOSEN AT RANDOM

$p(x_i | y_j)$ CONSTANT

(Courtesy of Thomas Sheridan. Used with permission.)




- **Bit view of Information**

- # of bits to disambiguate
- Bit = binary discrimination
- Drive uncertainty to zero

E. Z. I.

INTUITIVE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION -
HOW MANY BINARY DISCRIMINATIONS TO REDUCE
INITIAL UNCERTAINTY TO ZERO



ENVIRONMENT

INFORMATION IN MESSAGE SET

$$H = \log_2 \frac{1}{p(x)} = -\log_2 p(x) = 3 \text{ bit}$$

ET


$$H_{\text{AVG}} = \sum_i p(x_i) \log_2 \frac{1}{p(x_i)}$$

$$= -\sum_i p(x_i) \log_2 p(x_i) = 3$$

BUT NOT IF UNEQUIPROBABLE!

ANDROM

WHAT IF 6 OR 7 ITEMS? or if $p(x_i) = .99$
- STILL NEED 3 DISCRIMINATIONS SOMETIMES
TO REDUCE UNCERTAINTY TO ZERO



Info Transmission

H = information, D = Data

How to measure info. transmitted?

$$\begin{aligned} X_1 &\rightarrow H_1 \xrightarrow{\quad} D_1 \rightarrow Y_1 \\ X_2 &\rightarrow H_2 \xrightarrow{\quad} D_2 \rightarrow Y_2 \\ X_3 &\rightarrow H_3 \xrightarrow{\quad} D_3 \rightarrow Y_3 \end{aligned}$$

KNOWN APRIORI $p(H_i) \xrightarrow{\text{IMPROVED TO}} p(H_i | D_j)$

$$p(x_i) \qquad \qquad p(x_i | Y_j)$$

CRITERIA FOR A GOOD MEASURE

1) WHAT MEASURE $T = f[p(x_i), p(x_i | Y_j)]$

2) INFO. GAINED BY KNOWING Y_1 ADDS TO INFO. GAINED BY KNOWING Y_2 , ETC.

$$\begin{aligned} T[p(x_a), p(x_a | Y_k)] + T[p(x_b), p(x_b | Y_L)] \\ = T[p(x_a x_b), p(x_a x_b | Y_k Y_L)] \end{aligned}$$

T MUST BE OF FORM $[\log p(x_i | Y_j) - \log p(x_i)]$

$$= \log \frac{p(x_i | Y_j)}{p(x_i)}$$

SIMPLEST EXAMPLES

SEE Y_j
WHAT IS X_i ?

$$\uparrow p(Y_j)$$

.5	.5
.5	0
0	.5

SAME

AS

$$p(x_i | Y_j)$$

JOINT

.5	.5
1	0
0	1

$$p(x_i | Y_j)$$

CONDITIONAL

$$\begin{aligned} H(x) &= \sum_i p(x_i) \log_2 \frac{1}{p(x_i)} \\ &= .5 (\log_2 2) + .5 (\log_2 2) = 1 \end{aligned}$$


$$H(Y) = \text{SAME}$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} x_i \rightarrow Y_i \quad T_i = \log_2 p(x_i | Y_i) - \log_2 p(x_i) \\ \quad \quad \quad = \log_2 (1) - \log_2 (.5) = 1 \end{array} \right.$$

$$x_i \rightarrow Y_i \quad T_i = \text{SAME} = 1$$

$$T_{\text{AVE}} = .5(T_1) + .5(T_2) = 1$$

PERFECT INFO. TRANSMISSION



$$p(Y_j)$$

.5	.5
.5	.5
.5	.5
.5	.5

$p(x_i)$

$p(x_i | Y_j)$
JOINT

SAME AS

$$p(Y_j)$$

.5	.5
.5	.5
.5	.5
.5	.5

$p(x_i)$

$p(x_i | Y_j)$

TRANSMIT

$x_1 \rightarrow Y_1$	$T = 1 - 1 = 0$
$x_2 \rightarrow Y_2$	$T = 1 - 1 = 0$
$x_1 \rightarrow Y_2$	$T = 1 - 1 = 0$
$x_2 \rightarrow Y_1$	$T = 1 - 1 = 0$

NO INFO. TRANSMITTED
EVEN THO $H(X) = 1$

* IN GENERAL TRANSMITTED INFO

$$T(x:Y) = \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i | Y_j) \log_2 \frac{p(x_i | Y_j)}{p(x_i)}$$

MULTIPLY NUMERATOR AND DENOMINATOR BY $p(Y_j)$. THEN

$$\begin{aligned} T(x:Y) &= \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i | Y_j) \log_2 p(x_i | Y_j) && \text{MINUS JOINT INFO } -H(XY) \\ &\quad - \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i | Y_j) \log_2 p(x_i) && \text{INPUT INFO } H(X) \\ &\quad - \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i | Y_j) \log_2 p(Y_j) && \text{OUTPUT INFO } H(Y) \\ &= H(X) + H(Y) - H(XY) \\ T &= \text{INPUT + OUTPUT - JOINT} \end{aligned}$$


IF X AND Y UNCORRELATED, FROM GENL. EQN.

$$p(x_i | Y_j) = p(x_i) \rightarrow T = 0$$

IF X AND Y PERFECTLY CORRELATED

$$p(x_i | Y_j) = p(x_i) = p(Y_j)$$

$$T(x:Y) = H(X) = H(Y)$$




CAN ALSO REWRITE GENL. EQN.


$$\begin{aligned} T(X:Y) &= \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i, y_j) \log p(x_i, y_j) \\ &\quad - \sum_i p(x_i) \log p(x_i) \\ &= H(X) - H(X|Y) \\ \uparrow &= \text{INPUT - EQUIVOCATION} \end{aligned}$$

CAN ALSO REWRITE GENL. EQN.

MULT. NUM. + DENOM. BY $p(Y_j)/p(X_i)$

$$\begin{aligned} T(X:Y) &= \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i, y_j) \log \frac{p(x_i, y_j)}{p(x_i)} \\ &= \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i, y_j) \log p(y_j | x_i) \\ &\quad - \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i) \log p(y_j) \\ &= H(Y) - H(Y|X) \\ \uparrow &= \text{OUTPUT - NOISE} \end{aligned}$$






$$H(x) = \sum_i p_i \log \frac{1}{p_i} \quad \text{INPUT INFO.}$$

$$H(Y) = \sum_j p_j \log \frac{1}{p_j} \quad \text{OUTPUT INFO.}$$

$$H(x|Y) = \sum_i \sum_j p(x_i|Y_j) \log \frac{1}{p(x_i|Y_j)} \quad \text{EQUIVOCATION}$$

$$H(Y|X) = \sum_i \sum_j p(X_i|Y_j) \log \frac{1}{p(Y_j|X_i)} \quad \text{NOISE}$$

(Courtesy of Thomas Sheridan. Used with permission.)



Information Value

Assessing the Benefit of Providing Information

Average benefit from having perfect information (indicative of true state x), where one can select u to optimize for each x , is

$$V_p = \sum_i p(x_i) \max_j [V(x_i u_j)].$$

The best one can ever do from just knowing the a priori statistics is

$$V_0 = \max_j [\sum_i p(x_i) V(x_i u_j)].$$

The difference ($V_p - V_0$) is the net benefit of having the information if it were free.

As a first approximation, the cost (in complexity of hardware/software) of providing and/or of accessing the information (in computer or human time /distraction) is


$$C = \sum_i p(x_i) c(x_i) \log_2 [1/p(x_i)]$$

Then should provide the information IFF $(V_p - V_0) < C$


Information may become imperfect, e.g., state x changes with probability q to each other state before u takes effect. Then


$$V_I = \sum_i p(x_i) \cdot \{(1-q) \max_j [V(x_i u_j)] + q \sum_{k \neq i} [V(x_{k \neq i} u_j \text{ selected for } i)]\}$$

Then should provide information IFF $(V_I - V_0) < C$



INFO. RATE






Information Bandwidth

- **Information Rate**
 - Bits/Sec
- **Information Density**
- **Raster Example**
 - (# Pixels) (# Bits/Pixel) (Update Rate)





Task Performance & Bandwidth






Diagram from Sheridan, Teleoperation



Signal Detection Theory

- Originally Developed for Radar Threshold Detection
 - Becomes the Basis for Alerting Theory
 - Signal versus Noise
 - A-Scope Example
-

SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY



CONSIDER CASE OF ONLY 2 H_i DECISION:

Given a PAYOFF MATRIX

TRUE STATE OF WORLD:

	H_1	H_2
H_1	V_1	C_1
H_2	C_2	V_2

OVERBAR
MEANS
"DECISION"

IFF $E(\bar{H}_1) \geq E(\bar{H}_2)$ DECIDE H_1

$$E(\bar{H}_1) = p(H_1)V_1 - p(H_2)C_1$$

$$E(\bar{H}_2) = p(H_2)V_2 - p(H_1)C_2$$

DECIDE H_1 IF $[p(H_1)V_1 - p(H_2)C_1] \geq [p(H_2)V_2 - p(H_1)C_2]$

$$\text{i.e., IFF } \frac{p(H_1)}{p(H_2)} \geq \frac{V_2 + C_1}{V_1 + C_2}$$

LET $p(H_1)$ AND $p(H_2)$ BE PRIOR PROBABILITIES

THEN, AFTER ONE OBSERVATION d_1 , CRITERION BECOMES

$$\text{DECIDE } H_1 \text{ IFF } \frac{p(H_1 | d_1)}{p(H_2 | d_1)} \geq \frac{V_2 + C_1}{V_1 + C_2}$$


3

$$\frac{p(H_1 | d_i)}{p(H_2 | d_i)} = \frac{\frac{p(d_i | H_1) p(H_1)}{p(d_i)}}{\frac{p(d_i | H_2) p(H_2)}{p(d_i)}} \geq \frac{V_1 + C_1}{V_2 + C_2}$$


or $\underbrace{\frac{p(d_i | H_1)}{p(d_i | H_2)}}_{\text{LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION OR RATIO}} \geq \underbrace{\frac{p(H_1)}{p(H_2)} \cdot \frac{V_1 + C_1}{V_2 + C_2}}_{= K \text{ CUTOFF VALUE}}$

ALSO CALLED β


CONSIDER TWO DISTRIBUTIONS:




TYPE OF
OBSERVATION





WHERE TO
MARK
CUTOFF ?




BETTER TO MAKE LIKELIHOOD RATIO MONOTONIC
BY REORDERING!




(Courtesy of Thomas Sheridan. Used with permission.)




RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC




ROC CURVE IS WHAT HAPPENS AS SLIDE CUTOFF LINE FROM RIGHT TO LEFT AND INTEGRATE THE AREAS TO ITS RIGHT







EXPERIMENT: PRESENT SUBJECT WITH SIGNAL plus NOISE OR NOISE Alone

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE BASED ON
SUBJECTIVE CONFIDENCE SCALE OF [SIGNAL PRESENCE]




INTEGRATE FROM RIGHT, OBTAIN ROC FOR SUBJECT







Consider Sensor System



- **Radar**
 - **Engine Fire Detection**
 - **Other**
-



Threshold Placement



(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)

Threshold Placement


- Use specified $P(FA)$ or $P(MD)$
- Alerting Cost Function: Define C_{FA} , C_{MD} as alert decision costs

$$\begin{aligned} J &= P(FA) C_{FA} + P(MD) C_{MD} \\ &= P(FA) C_{FA} + (1 - P(CD)) C_{MD} \end{aligned}$$


Minimize Cost:

$$dJ = dP(FA) C_{FA} - dP(CD) C_{MD} = 0$$

$$\frac{dP(CD)}{dP(FA)} = \frac{C_{FA}}{C_{MD}}$$




Slope of SOC curve = cost ratio



Engine Fire Alerting

- C(FA) high on takeoff
- Alerts suppressed during TO




Now let's take a quick look at non-normal checklists.

The 777 EICAS message list is similar to other Boeing EICAS airplanes.

[For 747-400 operators: It doesn't use the "caret" symbol to indicate a checklist with no QRH items, like the 747-400s do.]

But it has an additional feature, called the "checklist icon". The icon is displayed next to an EICAS message whenever there is an ECL checklist that needs to be completed. Once the checklist is fully complete, the icon is removed from display next to the message. This helps the crew keep track of which checklists remain to be completed.



Crew Alerting Levels

Non-Normal Procedures

Time Critical Operational condition that requires immediate crew awareness and immediate action

Warning Operational or system condition that requires immediate crew awareness and definite corrective or compensatory action

Caution Operational or system condition that requires immediate crew awareness and possible corrective or compensatory action

Advisory Operational or system condition that requires crew awareness and possible corrective or compensatory action

Alternate Normal Procedures

Comm Alerts crew to incoming datalink communication

Memo Crew reminders of the current state of certain manually selected normal conditions

Source: Brian Kelly Boeing


Don't have time to discuss these levels.

Important thing to know is that we rigorously define and defend these levels

We apply them across all the systems.

The indications are consistent for all alerts at each level.

Thus the pilots instantly know the criticality and nature of an alert even before they know what the problem is



Boeing Color Use Guides

Red

Warnings, warning level limitations

Amber

Cautions, caution level limitations

White

Current status information

Green

Pilot selected data, mode annunciations

Magenta


Target information

Cyan


Background data

Again, we don't have time to describe these definitions in detail.


The important thing to note is that our philosophy is definite, and as simple as practical.
It fits on one page, in big font no less.



Access To Non-Normal Checklists




- Prevents choosing wrong checklist



When an alert message is displayed, the pilot simply pushes the CHKL button and the correct non-normal checklist is displayed. This prevents the crew from accidentally choosing the wrong checklist.

The non-normal checklists have priority over the normal checklists.



Non-Normal Checklists

- Checklist specific to left or right side
- Exact switch specified
- Memory items already complete
- Closed-loop conditional item
- Page bar

NON-NORMAL MENU	
	▶ FIRE ENG R ◀
Fire is detected in the right engine.	
✓	RIGHT AUTOTHROTTLE ARM SWITCH OFF
✓	RIGHT THRUST LEVER CLOSE
✓	RIGHT FUEL CONTROL SWITCH CUTOFF
✓	RIGHT ENGINE FIRE SWITCH PULL
✓	If FIRE ENG R message remains displayed:
<input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT ENGINE FIRE SWITCH ROTATE Rotate to the stop and hold for 1 second.	
NORMAL ITEM OVRD NOTES CHKL OVRD CHKL RESET	


This is what a typical normal checklist looks like. This is the Preflight checklist.

There are two kinds of line items, which we call open-loop and closed-loop items. The open-loop items have a gray check-box in front of them. These are items that the airplane systems cannot sense. The pilot determines whether the items have been completed and clicks the CCD thumbswitch when each item is complete.

Closed-loop items are for switches and selectors that are sensed by the airplane systems. They automatically turn green when the switch has been positioned correctly. If the crew actuates the wrong switch, the closed-loop item will not turn green and the crew will catch their error. In this example, the procedure was already complete, so the last two items are shown in green as soon as the checklist is displayed.

The white current line item box leads the pilot through the checklist and prevents accidentally skipping a line item.

Color is used to indicate line item status. Incomplete items are displayed white and complete items are displayed green. Cyan (or blue) indicates an inapplicable item, or an item that has been intentionally overridden by the crew using the ITEM OVRD button. In this example, the flight is dispatching with autobrakes inoperative, so the crew has overridden the AUTOBRAKE item. Overriding the item allows the checklist to be completed.




Internal vs External Threat Systems


- **Internal**

- System normally well defined
- Logic relatively static
- Simple ROC approach valid
- Examples (Oil Pressure, Fire, Fuel, ...)


- **External**

- External environment may not be well defined
 - ◆ Stochastic elements
- Controlled system trajectory may be important
 - ◆ Human response
- Need ROC like approach which considers entire system
- System Operating Characteristic (SOC) approach of Kuchar
- Examples (Traffic, Terrain, Weather, ...)







Decision-Aiding / Alerting System Architecture




(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)



Fundamental Tradeoff in Alerting Decisions




- **When to alert?**
 - Too early ↗ Unnecessary Alert
 - ◆ Operator would have avoided hazard without alert
 - ◆ Leads to distrust of system, delayed response
 - Too late ↗ Missed Detection
 - ◆ Incident occurs even with the alerting system
- **Must balance Unnecessary Alerts and Missed Detections**




The Alerting Decision


- **Examine consequences of alerting / not alerting**
 - Alert is not issued: Nominal Trajectory (N)
 - Alert is issued: Avoidance Trajectory (A)




Compute probability of Incident along each trajectory




System Operating Characteristic Curve




(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)



Trajectory Modeling Methods




(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)




Nominal Trajectory Prediction-Based Alerting


- Alert when projected trajectory encounters hazard




- Look ahead time and trajectory model are design parameters
- Examples: TCAS, GPWS, AILS




Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) (nominal trajectory prediction-based)






Alert Trajectory Prediction-Based Alerting

- Alert is issued as soon as safe escape path is threatened**




- Attempt to ensure minimum level of safety**
 - Some loss of control over false alarms**
 - Example: Probabilistic parallel approach logic (Carpenter & Kuchar)**
-




Example State Uncertainty Propagation

Computed via Monte Carlo


along-track $\sigma = 15$ kt
cross-track $\sigma = 1$ nmi
(from NASA Ames)




(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)




Monte Carlo Simulation Structure




Implemented in real-time simulation studies at NASA Ames
Computational time on the order of 1 sec




System Operating Characteristic Curve




(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)




Aircraft Collision Avoidance







Fatal Accident Causes




Adapted from The Boeing Company




Prototype MIT Terrain Alerting Displays



Enhanced GPWS Improves Terrain/Situational Awareness






Terrain Alerting


TAWS Look-Ahead Alerts (Terrain Database)

“Terrain, Terrain, Pull Up...”
approx 22 sec.

“Caution Terrain”
approx 45 sec


Basic GPWS modes
(radar altitude)







TAWS Look-ahead Warning

- Threat terrain is shown in solid red
- “Pull up” light or PFD message
- Colored terrain on navigation display







Conflict Detection and Resolution Framework



(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)




Multiple Alerting System Conflicts



Adapted from Jim Kuchar.

- Developing formal methods for system analysis
 - Identification of conflicts and methods to mitigate
 - Drivers / implications for human interaction
-




Design Principles for Alerting and Decision-Aiding Systems for Automobiles


James K. Kuchar

Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Massachusetts Institute of Technology



Kinematics




- Alert time: $t_{\text{alert}} = (r - d)/v$


$t_{\text{alert}} = 0 \rightarrow \text{braking must begin immediately}$

$t_{\text{alert}} = \tau \rightarrow \text{alert is issued } \tau \text{ seconds before braking is required}$


- Determine $P(\text{UA})$ and $P(\text{SA})$ as function of t_{alert}




Example Human Response Time Distribution




Lognormal distribution (mode = 1.07 s, dispersion = 0.49) [Najm et al.]




Case 3: Add Response Delay Uncertainty




(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)



Case 4: Add Deceleration Uncertainty




$$\sigma_a = 3 \text{ ft/s}^2$$



Conformance Monitoring for Internal and Collision Alerting


- **Simple Sensor Based Collision Alerting Systems Do Not Provide Adequate Alert Performance due to Kinematics**
 - SOC Curve Analysis
 - ◆ P(FA), P(MD) Performance
- **Enhanced Collision Alerting Systems Require Inference or Measurement of Higher Order Intent States**
 - Automatic Dependent Surveillance (Broadcast)
 - Environment Inferencing
 - ◆ Observed States



SURVEILLANCE STATE VECTOR

- Aircraft Surveillance State Vector, $X(t)$ containing uncertainty & errors $\delta X(t)$ is given by:
 - Traditional dynamic states
 - Intent and goal states


$$X(t) = \begin{Bmatrix} \textbf{\textit{Position}}, R(t) \\ \textbf{\textit{Velocity}}, V(t) \\ \textbf{\textit{Acceleration}}, A(t) \\ \textbf{\textit{Intent}}, I(t) \\ \textbf{\textit{Goals}}, G(t) \\ \vdots \end{Bmatrix}, \quad \delta X(t) = \begin{Bmatrix} \delta R(t) \\ \delta V(t) \\ \delta A(t) \\ \delta I(t) \\ \delta G(t) \\ \vdots \end{Bmatrix}$$




INTENT STATE VECTOR

- Intent State Vector can be separated into current target states and subsequent states


$$I(t) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Current target states} \\ \textit{Subsequent planned trajectory} \end{array} \right\} \quad (\text{Eqn. 3})$$



Automobile Lateral Tracking Loop



(Courtesy of James Kuchar. Used with permission.)



Intent Observability States

- **Roadway**
 - **Indicator Lights**
 - Break Lights
 - Turn Signals
 - Stop Lights
 - **Acceleration States**
 - **GPS Routing**
 - **Head Position**
 - **Dynamic History**
 - **Tracking Behavior**
-