

Summary

- Structured representations are important
 - Abstract
 - Recursive
 - Generative
- New primitive concepts can be learned
 - Learning the most parsimonious theory
- How to combine structured representations and statistical inference?
 - Statistical parsing in language
 - Statistical grammar induction
 - Probabilistic inferences about kin relations.
 - Statistical learning of relational concepts and theories.

Outline for today

- The debate about structure in people's mental representations of concepts
 - Hierarchies or hidden units?
 - Logical relations or hidden units?
 - Definitions or prototypes?
- Probabilistic inference

Semantic networks (Quillian, 1968)




Figure of semantic trees from Quillian (1968). Quillian, M. R. "Semantic Memory." In *Semantic Information Processing*. Edited by M. Minsky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968, pp. 216-270.

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Why semantic networks?

- Economical encoding of information.
(a big deal in 1968.)
- Supports generalization.
 - If you learn that a draxel is a bird, you can expect that a draxel has wings, can fly, and has feathers.

Generalization in a semantic network




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Inferring mental structure through reaction times (Collins & Quillian, 1969)

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Collins, A. M., and M. R. Quillian. "Retrieval Time from Semantic Memory." *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 8 (1969): 240-248.

General finding: the more of the hierarchy a relation spans, the longer it takes to verify.

Reaction time data

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Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 8 (1969): 240-248.

“Cleaned up” reaction time data

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Problems


- Typicality effects.
 - “robin is a bird” faster than “chicken is a bird”.
- Violations of hierarchy for atypical items.
 - “chicken is an animal” faster than “chicken is a bird.”
- Rosch: Graded prototype representations more important than all-or-none “is a” relations.

Problems

- Typicality effects.
 - “robin is a bird” faster than “chicken is a bird”.
- Violations of hierarchy for atypical items.
 - “chicken is an animal” faster than “chicken is a bird.”
- But do these problems require us to give up on “is a” hierarchies?

Possible solutions

- We have multiple trees, a default and some alternative hypotheses.
 - In default tree: chicken falls under bird.
 - In alternative tree: chicken falls under animal.



Default

Alternative




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Possible solutions

- We have multiple trees, a default and some alternative hypotheses.
 - In default tree: chicken falls under bird.
 - In alternative tree: chicken falls under animal.
- The word “bird” maps onto two nodes, one referring just to typical birds and the other to *all* birds.




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


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


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 - In default tree: chicken falls under bird.
 - In alternative tree: chicken falls under animal.
- The word “bird” maps onto two nodes, one referring just to typical birds and the other to *all* birds.
- Deny that prototype effects are diagnostic of core representations.

Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman

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Armstrong, S. L., L. R. Gleitman, and H. Gleitman. "What Some Concepts might not be." *Cognition* 13, no. 3 (May 1983): 263-308.

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- Prototype ratings and reaction time effects for clearly definitional concepts shows that these data are not diagnostic of conceptual structure.

Why not give up on a definitional core for concepts?

- Reasoning, e.g., “Consider a new person, Boris.”
 - Is the mother of Boris’s father his grandmother?
 - Is the mother of Boris’s sister his mother?
 - Is Boris’s uncle his grandfather?
 - Is the son of Boris’s sister his son?
- Compositionality in concepts and language
 - e.g., Greatgrandmother = mother of a grandparent.
 - “Colorless green idea”
 - “Big”

Why not give up on a definitional core for concepts?

- Even without definitions, need a distinction between typicality and degree of membership.
 - At some level we know for certain that chickens are birds. (Consider a bet....)
 - Some categories really are graded in their membership:

green or blue?

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copyright considerations.

cup or bowl?

Other problems for all-or-none semantic relations

- Graded generalization
 - Which is a stronger inference?

Canaries have sesamoid bones.

Chickens have sesamoid bones.

All birds have sesamoid bones.

All birds have sesamoid bones.

- More of a problem, as generalization is the main function that “is a” hierarchies are supposed to fulfill.
- Others?

An alternative architecture

- Semantic networks are symbolic:
 - encode discrete, localized bits of knowledge.
- Neural networks are subsymbolic:
 - inspired by long-term memory in the brain (synaptic plasticity).
 - graded representations that can approximate symbolic models, e.g., “is a” hierarchies, while still capturing prototypicality.

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Training set

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Learned distributed representation

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Generalization test

- Train on one fact for new object:
 - Draxel ISA bird
- Network then believes that a Draxel has other properties in common to most other birds . . .
 - can fly, has wings, has feathers.
- . . . but not properties distinctive to individual birds (e.g., is red or is yellow).

Hierarchical structure in conceptual development

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Keil. "The Development of the Young Child's Ability to Anticipate the Outcomes of Simple Causal Events." *Child Development* 50 (1979): 455-462.

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Development of hierarchy in network

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Problems

- Collapses typicality and graded membership.
 - *Chicken* activates the *Bird* unit less than *Canary* does.
 - But recall:
 - At some level we know for certain that chickens are birds.
 - Some categories really are graded in their membership:

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copyright considerations.

cup or bowl?

Problems

- Requires special care in training.
 - Lots of training data, must be randomly interleaved throughout training.
 - Potential for “catastrophic interference” when learning a new fact, without freezing weights.
 - As knowledge base grows, need to add hidden units (to preserve bottleneck ratio for good generalization).
 - When learning a novel proposition, “blickets may queem”, some controller needs to specify that *blicket* initializes a new input node, *queem* a new output node, and *may* a new relation ndoe.

Problems

- Doesn't know certain obvious things unless explicitly trained:
 - “A bird is a bird”: we don't have to check that fact the same way we check “a bird is an animal”.
 - “A blicket is a blicket”.
 - If these are living things,

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they are either plants or animals. If animal, they are some kind of animal -- not “just” an animal. (i.e., Must initialize an unlabeled node under *animal*, which is then a candidate word meaning.)

Fodor and Pylyshyn: What's missing from connectionism?

- Systematicity
 - The thoughts a cognitive system is capable of are not a random collection (like the phrases in a tourist's foreign language-phrasebook) but a systematic set (like the sentences that can be produced by a fluent speaker of a language).
 - If it can think *Sandy loves Kim*, then it can entertain the thought *Kim loves Sandy*.

Learning family relationships (Hinton, 1986)

- Tree structure generates relations:

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Hinton, G. E. "Learning Distributed Representations of Concepts." *Proc. Ann. Conf. of the Cognitive Science Society* 1 (1986).

Learning family relationships

(Hinton, 1986)

- Network architecture:

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Learning family relationships

(Hinton, 1986)

- 112 possible facts of the form:
 - <person1, relation, person2>
 - <Christopher, father-of, Victoria> ,
 - <Colin, son-of, Victoria> ,
 - <Jennifer, aunt-of, Colin> . . .
- Trained on 108 examples, network usually generalizes well to the other 4.
 - Doesn't work with less training.

Learning family relationships

(Hinton, 1986)

- Does this really count as systematicity?
 - With so much training required, and so little generalization ability?
 - Every time you learn about a new person, still need an external controller to add that person to both the input layer and output layer. That's the *real* source of systematicity.

Linear Relational Embedding

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- Minor improvement, from 4 to 8 or 12 generalization trials.

Learning family relationships

(Hinton, 1986)

- Problem: Consider a new person, Boris.
 - Is the mother of Boris's father his grandmother?
 - Is the mother of Boris's sister his mother?
 - Is Boris's uncle his grandfather?
 - Is the son of Boris's sister his son?

A Big open question

- How to integrate abstract knowledge with probabilistic (or typicality-based) reasoning?
 - Is the son of Boris's sister his son? (*Note: Boris and his family were stranded on a desert island when he was a young boy.*)
 - Is Boris's son his wife's son?
 - Boris has five aunts. How many cousins does he have?

A challenge for either approach

- “Because Sarah loves him, John hates Bill.”
 - Who does “him” refer to?
 - How to represent this thought?

- Two hypotheses:

 - cause(loves(Sarah,Bill), hates(John,Bill))

 - cause(loves(Sarah,John), hates(John,Bill))

- Why prefer the first?

 - Inference rules:

 - implies(and(cause(x,y), cause(y,z)), cause(x,z))

 - implies(cause(and(x,y),z), cause(x,z))

 - Beliefs with high probability:

 - cause(and(loves(x,y), loves(y,z), not(loves(y,x))), jealous(x,z))

 - cause(jealous(x,y), hates(x,y))

 - First hypothesis would be true if:

 - loves(John,Sarah)

 - not(loves(Sarah,John))

 - No such simple explanation for second hypothesis.

So...

... why do we keep having this debate:
rules/symbols vs. prototypes/connections?

Other cases:

- Language acquisition and processing, e.g. past tense
- Schemas and scripts for events and actions
- Visual object recognition and scene perception

So...

- ... why do we keep having this debate:
rules/symbols vs. prototypes/connections?
- ... and why do none of the standard
approaches seem to be satisfying?

So...

The real problem: a spurious contest between logic and probability.

- Neither logic nor probability on its own is sufficient to account for human cognition:
 - Generativity
 - Systematicity
 - Recursion and abstraction
 - Flexibility
 - Effective under great uncertainty (e.g., sparse data)
- What we really need is to understand how logic and probability can work together.

So...

The real problem: a spurious contest between logic and probability.

- A confusion between knowledge representations and inference processes:

Gradedness or fuzziness doesn't necessarily mean that the knowledge representations lack structure or rules -- merely that the inference processes incorporate uncertainty.

- Probabilistic inference over structured representations is what we need.