

14.581 International Trade  
— Lecture 9: Factor Proportion Theory (II) —

- ① Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model
  - ① Integrated equilibrium
  - ② Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
- ② High-dimensional issues
  - ① Classical theorems revisited
  - ② Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Theorem
- ③ Quantitative Issues

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Basic environment

- Results derived in previous lecture hold for small open economies
  - relative good prices were taken as exogenously given
- We now turn world economy with two countries, North and South
- We maintain the two-by-two HO assumptions:
  - there are two goods,  $g = 1, 2$ , and two factors,  $k$  and  $l$
  - identical technology around the world,  $y_g = f_g(k_g, l_g)$
  - identical homothetic preferences around the world,  $d_g^c = \alpha_g(p)I^c$
- **Question**  
What is the pattern of trade in this environment?

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Strategy

- Start from **Integrated Equilibrium**  $\equiv$  competitive equilibrium that would prevail if *both* goods and factors were freely traded
- Consider **Free Trade Equilibrium**  $\equiv$  competitive equilibrium that prevails if goods are freely traded, but factors are not
- Ask: Can free trade equilibrium reproduce integrated equilibrium?
- *If factor prices are equalized through trade*, the answer is yes
- In this situation, one can then use homotheticity to go from differences in factor endowments to pattern of trade

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Integrated equilibrium

- **Integrated equilibrium** corresponds to  $(p, \omega, y)$  such that:

$$(ZP) : p = A'(\omega) \omega \quad (1)$$

$$(GM) : y = \alpha(p) (\omega' v) \quad (2)$$

$$(FM) : v = A(\omega) y \quad (3)$$

where:

- $p \equiv (p_1, p_2)$ ,  $\omega \equiv (w, r)$ ,  $A(\omega) \equiv [a_{fg}(\omega)]$ ,  $y \equiv (y_1, y_2)$ ,  $v \equiv (l, k)$ ,  
 $\alpha(p) \equiv [\alpha_1(p), \alpha_2(p)]$
- $A(\omega)$  derives from cost-minimization
- $\alpha(p)$  derives from utility-maximization

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Free trade equilibrium

- **Free trade equilibrium** corresponds to  $(p^t, \omega^n, \omega^s, y^n, y^s)$  such that:

$$(ZP) : p^t \leq A'(\omega^c) \omega^c \text{ for } c = n, s \quad (4)$$

$$(GM) : y^n + y^s = \alpha(p^t) (\omega^{n'} v^n + \omega^{s'} v^s) \quad (5)$$

$$(FM) : v^c = A(\omega^c) y^c \text{ for } c = n, s \quad (6)$$

where (4) holds with equality if good is produced in country  $c$

- **Definition** *Free trade equilibrium replicates integrated equilibrium if  $\exists (y^n, y^s) \geq 0$  such that  $(p, \omega, \omega, y^n, y^s)$  satisfy conditions (4)-(6)*

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Factor Price Equalization (FPE) Set

- **Definition**  $(v^n, v^s)$  are in the FPE set if  $\exists (y^n, y^s) \geq 0$  such that condition (6) holds for  $\omega^n = \omega^s = \omega$ .
- **Lemma** If  $(v^n, v^s)$  is in the FPE set, then free trade equilibrium replicates integrated equilibrium
- **Proof:** By definition of the FPE set,  $\exists (y^n, y^s) \geq 0$  such that

$$v^c = A(\omega) y^c$$

So Condition (6) holds. Since  $v = v^n + v^s$ , this implies


$$v = A(\omega) (y^n + y^s)$$

Combining this expression with condition (3), we obtain  $y^n + y^s = y$ . Since  $\omega^n v^n + \omega^s v^s = \omega' v$ , Condition (5) holds as well. Finally, Condition (1) directly implies (4) holds.

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

Integrated equilibrium: graphical analysis


- Factor market clearing in the integrated equilibrium:



# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## The “Parallelogram”

- **FPE set**  $\equiv (v^n, v^s)$  inside the parallelogram



- When  $v^n$  and  $v^s$  are inside the parallelogram, we say that they belong to the same **diversification cone**
- This is a very different way of approaching FPE than FPE Theorem
  - Here, we have shown that there can be FPE iff factor endowments are not too dissimilar, whether or not there are no FIR
  - Instead of taking prices as given—whether or not they are consistent with integrated equilibrium—we take factor endowments as primitives



# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem: alternative proof

- HO Theorem can also be derived using Rybczynski effect:
  - ① Rybczynski theorem  $\Rightarrow y_2^n / y_1^n > y_2^s / y_1^s$  for any  $p$
  - ② Homotheticity  $\Rightarrow c_2^n / c_1^n = c_2^s / c_1^s$  for any  $p$
  - ③ This implies  $p_2^n / p_1^n < p_2^s / p_1^s$  under autarky
  - ④ Law of comparative advantage  $\Rightarrow$  HO Theorem

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Trade and inequality


- Predictions of HO and SS Theorems are often combined:
  - HO Theorem  $\Rightarrow p_2^n / p_1^n < p_2 / p_1 < p_2^s / p_1^s$
  - SS Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  *Moving from autarky to free trade, real return of abundant factor increases, whereas real return of scarce factor decreases*
  - If North is skill-abundant relative to South, inequality increases in the North and decreases in the South
- So why may we observe a rise in inequality in the South in practice?
  - Southern countries are not moving from autarky to free trade
  - Technology is not identical around the world
  - Preferences are not homothetic and identical around the world
  - There are more than two goods and two countries in the world

# Two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model

## Trade volumes

- Let us define trade volumes as the sum of exports plus imports
- Inside FPE set, iso-volume lines are parallel to diagonal (HKa p.23)
  - the further away from the diagonal, the larger the trade volumes
  - factor abundance rather than country size determines trade volume

volumes




- If country size affects trade volumes in practice, what should we infer?

# High-Dimensional Predictions

FPE (I): More factors than goods


- Suppose now that there are  $F$  factors and  $G$  goods
- By definition,  $(v^n, v^s)$  is in the FPE set if  $\exists (y^n, y^s) \geq 0$  s.t.  $v^c = A(\omega) y^c$  for  $c = n, s$
- If  $F = G$  (“even case”), the situation is qualitatively similar
- If  $F > G$ , the FPE set will be “measure zero”:  
 $\{v \mid v = A(\omega) y^c \text{ for } y^c \geq 0\}$  is a  $G$ -dimensional cone in  $F$ -dimensional space
- **Example:** “Macro” model with 1 good and 2 factors



# High-Dimensional Predictions

## FPE (II): More goods than factors

- If  $F < G$ , there will be indeterminacies in production,  $(y^n, y^s)$ , and so, trade patterns, but FPE set will still have positive measure
- **Example:** 3 goods and 2 factors



- By the way, are there more goods than factors in the world?

# High-Dimensional Predictions

Stolper-Samuelson-type results (I): “Friends and Enemies”

- SS Theorem was derived by differentiating zero-profit condition
- With an arbitrary number of goods and factors, we still have

$$\hat{p}_g = \sum_f \theta_{fg} \hat{w}_f \quad (7)$$

where  $w_f$  is the price of factor  $f$  and  $\theta_{fg} \equiv w_f a_{fg}(\omega) / c_g(\omega)$

- Now suppose that  $\hat{p}_{g_0} > 0$ , whereas  $\hat{p}_g = 0$  for all  $g \neq g_0$
- Equation (7) immediately implies the existence of  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{w}_{f_1} &\geq \hat{p}_{g_0} > \hat{p}_g = 0 \text{ for all } g \neq g_0, \\ \hat{w}_{f_2} &< \hat{p}_g = 0 < \hat{p}_{g_0} \text{ for all } g \neq g_0. \end{aligned}$$

- So every good is “friend” to some factor and “enemy” to some other (Jones and Scheinkman 1977)

# High-Dimensional Predictions

## Stolper-Samuelson-type results (II): Correlations

- Ethier (1984) also provides the following variation of SS Theorem
- If good prices change from  $p$  to  $p'$ , then the associated change in factor prices,  $\omega' - \omega$ , must satisfy

$$(\omega' - \omega) A(\omega_0) (p' - p) > 0, \text{ for some } \omega_0 \text{ between } \omega \text{ and } \omega'$$

- **Proof:**

Define  $f(\omega) = \omega A(\omega) (p' - p)$ . Mean value theorem implies

$$f(\omega') = \omega A(\omega) (p' - p) + (\omega' - \omega) [A(\omega_0) + \omega_0 dA(\omega_0)] (p' - p)$$

for some  $\omega_0$  between  $\omega$  and  $\omega'$ . Cost-minimization at  $\omega_0$  requires

$$\omega_0 dA(\omega_0) = 0$$

# High-Dimensional Predictions

## Stolper-Samuelson-type results (II): Correlations

- **Proof (Cont.):**

Combining the two previous expressions, we obtain

$$f(\omega') - f(\omega) = (\omega' - \omega) A(\omega_0) (p' - p)$$

From zero profit condition, we know that  $p = \omega A(\omega)$  and  $p' = \omega' A(\omega')$ . Thus

$$f(\omega') - f(\omega) = (p' - p) (p' - p) > 0$$

The last two expressions imply

$$(\omega' - \omega) A(\omega_0) (p' - p) > 0$$

- **Interpretation:**

Tendency for changes in good prices to be accompanied by raises in prices of factors used intensively in goods whose prices have gone up

- What is  $\omega_0$ ?

# High-Dimensional Predictions

## Rybczynski-type results

- Rybczynski Theorem was derived by differentiating the factor market clearing condition
- If  $G = F > 2$ , same logic implies that increase in endowment of one factor decreases output of one good and increases output of another (Jones and Scheinkman 1977)
- If  $G < F$ , increase in endowment of one factor may increase output of all goods (Ricardo-Viner)
- In this case, we still have the following correlation (Ethier 1984)

$$(v' - v) A(\omega) (y' - y) = (v' - v) (v' - v) > 0$$

- If  $G > F$ , indeterminacies in production imply that we cannot predict changes in output vectors

# High-Dimensional Predictions

## Heckscher-Ohlin-type results

- Since HO Theorem derives from Rybczynski effect + homotheticity, problems of generalization in the case  $G < F$  and  $F > G$  carry over to the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
- If  $G = F > 2$ , we can invert the factor market clearing condition

$$y^c = A^{-1}(\omega) v^c$$

- By homotheticity, the vector of consumption in country  $c$  satisfies

$$d^c = s^c d$$

where  $s^c \equiv c$ 's share of world income, and  $d \equiv$  world consumption

- Good and factor market clearing requires

$$d = y = A^{-1}(\omega) v$$

- Combining the previous expressions, we get net exports

$$t^c \equiv y^c - d^c = A^{-1}(\omega) (v^c - s^c v)$$

# High-Dimensional Predictions

## Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Theorem

- Without assuming that  $G = F$ , we can still derive sharp predictions if we focus on the *factor content of trade* rather than *commodity trade*
- We define the *net exports of factor  $f$*  by country  $c$  as

$$\tau_f^c = \sum_g a_{fg}(\omega) t_g^c$$

- In matrix terms, this can be rearranged as

$$\tau^c = A(\omega) t^c$$

- **HOV Theorem** *In any country  $c$ , net exports of factors satisfy*

$$\tau^c = v^c - s^c v$$

- So countries should export the factors in which they are abundant compared to the world:  $v_f^c > s^c v_f$
- Assumptions of HOV Theorem are extremely strong: identical technology, FPE, homotheticity
  - One shouldn't be too surprised if it performs miserably in practice...

- Stolper-Samuelson offers sharp insights about distributional consequences of international trade, but...
  - Theoretical insights are only *qualitative*
  - Theoretical insights crucially rely on  $2 \times 2$  assumptions
- Alternatively one may want to know the *quantitative* importance of international trade:
  - Given the amount of trade that we actually observe in the data, how large are the effects of international trade on the skill premium?
  - In a country like the United States, how much higher or smaller would the skill premium be in the absence of trade?

# Quantitative Issues

## Eaton and Kortum (2002) Revisited

- Eaton and Kortum (2002)—as well as other gravity models—offer a simple starting point to think about these issues
- Consider multi-sector-multi-factor EK (e.g. Chor JIE 2010)
  - many varieties with different productivity levels  $z(\omega)$  in each sector  $s$
  - same factor intensity across varieties within sectors
  - different factor intensities across sectors
- Unit costs of production in country  $i$  and sector  $s$  are proportional to:

$$c_{i,s} = \left[ \left( \mu_s^H \right)^\rho \left( w_i^H \right)^{1-\rho} + \left( \mu_s^L \right)^\rho \left( w_i^L \right)^{1-\rho} \right]^{1/(1-\rho)} \quad (8)$$

where:

- $w_i^H, w_i^L \equiv$  wages of skilled and unskilled workers.
- $\rho \equiv$  elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled

- Suppose, like in EK, that productivity draws across varieties within sectors are independently drawn from a Fréchet
- Then one can show that the following gravity equation holds:

$$X_{ij,s} = \frac{T_i (\tau_{ij,s} c_{i,s})^{-\theta_s}}{\sum_{l=1}^n T_l (\tau_{lj,s} c_{l,s})^{-\theta_s}} E_{j,s}, \quad (9)$$

where  $E_{j,s} \equiv$  total expenditure on goods from sector  $s$  in country  $j$

- Two key equations, (8) and (9), are CES:
  - One can use DEK's strategy to do welfare and counterfactual analysis
  - But one can also discuss the consequences of changes in variable trade costs,  $\tau_{lj,s}$ , or technology,  $T_i$ , on skill premium
  - How large are GT compared to distributional consequences?

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Spring 2013

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