


# 14.662 Recitation 6

Autor, Manning, and Smith (2015)

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# Wage Inequality and the Minimum Wage



- 50 log point fall in real federal minimum wage, 1974-2007
- Contemporaneous rise in 50/10 earnings gap (more for females)

## Competing Accounts of the Minimum Wage

- We've encountered the minimum wage as an institution before: recall the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) density decomposition
  - 40-65% of the rise in 50/10 earnings gap due to falling real min. wage
  - The rest: unions, supply and demand factors
- Lee (1999) reaches quite different conclusion: *more than* the entire rise in 50/10 gap between 1979 and 1988 due to the falling minimum
  - If the minimum hadn't changed, inequality would have fallen, not risen
- Lee's estimating equation:

$$w_{st}^p - w_{st}^{50} = \beta_1(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50}) + \beta_2(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50})^2 + \gamma_t^p + \eta_{st}^p \quad (1)$$

where  $w_{st}^p$  is log real wage at percentile  $p$  in state  $s$  and time  $t$ , and  $w_{st}^m$  is the log minimum wage

- "Bindingness" of the minimum wage: quadratic in  $w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50}$
- Issues with this specification?

## Issues with Lee (1999)

- Likely to be permanent differences across states and different trends in wage distribution:

$$\eta_{st}^p = \sigma_{s0}^p + \sigma_{s1}^p \times time_t + \varepsilon_{st}^{\sigma,p}$$

$$w_{st}^{50} = \mu_{s0} + \mu_{s1} \times time_t + \varepsilon_{st}^{\mu}$$

- OLS estimation of (1) biased if  $(\sigma_{s0}^p, \sigma_{s1}^p)$  correlated with  $(\mu_{s0}, \mu_{s1})$
- Transitory fluctuations in distribution,  $\varepsilon_{st}^{\sigma,p}$  and  $\varepsilon_{st}^{\mu}$ , likely correlated
  - Even including state FEs and state-specific trends, and even if  $w_{st}^m$  randomly set, may have  $(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50})$  correlated with  $\varepsilon_{st}^{\sigma,p}$
- Autor, Manning, and Smith (2015) solution: instrument  $(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50})$  and  $(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50})^2$  with  $w_{st}^m$ ,  $w_{st}^{m2}$ , and  $w_{st}^m \times \bar{w}_s^{50}$ , where  $\bar{w}_s^{50}$  is average log median real wage for the state
  - Similar in spirit to Card, Katz, and Krueger (1993)

## AMS (2015) vs. Lee (1999)

- AMS (2015) second stage:

$$w_{st}^p - w_{st}^{50} = \beta_1(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50}) + \beta_2(w_{st}^m - w_{st}^{50})^2 + \gamma_t^p \quad (2) \\ + \sigma_{s0}^p + \sigma_{s1}^p \times \text{time}_t + \varepsilon_{st}^{\sigma:p}$$

- Three key differences relative to Lee's analysis:
  - Include state FE's and state-specific trends
  - Instrument effective minimum wage
  - Incorporate additional 21 years of data (1979-2012)
- Also estimate (2) in first differences as a robustness check
- Fixing Lee greatly reduces estimated impact at lower percentiles (eliminates for males), cleans up spurious findings at higher percentiles
  - Get strong first stage for IV from 1991 state legislation; extending to 2012 only improves precision

## AMS (2015) Estimates


## A. Females

	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	2SLS (3)	2SLS (4)	Lee Spec (5)
5	0.44 (0.03)	0.54 (0.05)	0.32 (0.04)	0.39 (0.05)	0.63 (0.04)
10	0.27 (0.03)	0.46 (0.03)	0.22 (0.05)	0.17 (0.03)	0.52 (0.03)
20	0.12 (0.03)	0.29 (0.03)	0.10 (0.05)	0.07 (0.03)	0.29 (0.03)
30	0.07 (0.01)	0.23 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.15 (0.02)
40	0.04 (0.02)	0.17 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07 (0.01)
75	0.09 (0.02)	0.24 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.02)
90	0.15 (0.03)	0.34 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Var. of log wage	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.20 (0.03)
Levels / First-Diff	Levels	FD	Levels	FD	Levels
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
State trends	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

## B. Males


	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	2SLS (3)	2SLS (4)	Lee Spec (5)
5	0.25 (0.02)	0.43 (0.03)	0.17 (0.02)	0.16 (0.04)	0.55 (0.04)
10	0.12 (0.04)	0.34 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.38 (0.04)
20	0.06 (0.03)	0.24 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.21 (0.03)
30	0.05 (0.02)	0.19 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)
40	0.06 (0.01)	0.15 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.01)
75	0.14 (0.02)	0.24 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.09 (0.04)
90	0.16 (0.03)	0.30 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.14 (0.07)
Var. of log wage	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.05)
Levels / First-Diff	Levels	FD	Levels	FD	Levels
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
State trends	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

# Counterfactual Wage Distribution




- Declining min. wage explains 30-40% of rise in lower-tail inequality

# Minimum Wage Spillovers?



- Why should the minimum wage affect the 50/10 gap at all?
  - Earnings spillovers (e.g. positional income concerns) vs. reporting error

Reporting Error at  $w^m$ 

- How much reporting error is needed to generate observed effects at higher percentiles (under the null of no spillovers)?

## A Model of Reporting Error

- Percentile of latent wage distribution  $p^*$ , latent wage  $w^*(p^*)$
- True wage at percentile  $p^*$ :  $w(p^*) = \max(w^m, w^*(p^*))$
- For a worker at  $p^*$  we actually observe  $w_i = w(p^*) + \varepsilon_i$

Prop: If  $\varepsilon_i$  is independent of the true wage, the elasticity of wages at an observed percentile  $p$  with respect to the minimum equals the fraction of people at  $p$  whose true wage equals the minimum

*Intuition*: If  $w^m$  rises by 10 percent, and 10 percent of workers at  $p$  are actually at the min, observed wages will rise by 1 percent


Corollary: The elasticity of mean log wages with respect to the minimum equals the fraction of individuals actually paid the minimum

*Intuition*: If 10 percent of workers are at the min, a 10 percent rise in the min will increase the *true and observed* mean wage by 1 percent

## Testing for Spillovers

- Under the null, effect of log effective minimum on average log real wages equals the true fraction of individuals paid the minimum
  - AMS estimate around 0.025-0.075 for most years, 1979-2012
- To test for the null of spillovers, need a second estimate (which should be the same under the null)
- Starting point: all observations below the minimum must reflect reporting error
  - Use MLE to estimate distribution of error (assumed symmetric)
  - Observed spike at minimum means error has mass  $\gamma$  at  $\varepsilon_i = 0$
  - Assume normality conditional on  $\varepsilon_i \neq 0$ , jointly estimate  $(\sigma_\varepsilon^2, \gamma)$
  - Dividing observed spike by  $\gamma$  estimates true spike
- Small twist: can only run this second estimate on a sample for which the effective minimum is reported (omits tipped workers)
  - Bound estimate by letting true spike for tipped workers range  $0 \rightarrow 1$

# Testing for Spillovers: Results



- Estimates consistent with the null of no spillovers

## AMS (2015) Takeaways

- A careful re-analysis of earlier findings with today's higher standards for empirical work
  - Clear analysis of identification concerns
  - Defend instrument choice, ensure strong first stage
  - Run lots of robustness checks, show what's driving results
  - Push out frontier with a bit of structure
- Returns to upgrading often high: AMS just accepted to AEJ: Applied
  - Similar low-hanging upgrading fruit likely out there
  - No doubt helped by strong policy relevancy

# Problem Set #2

- Questions?

MIT OpenCourseWare  
<http://ocw.mit.edu>

## 14.662 Labor Economics II

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